Admitindo o pós-positivismo jurídico como a teoria que pretende reconciliar o Direito, moral e política em uma sociedade complexa e plural, foi identificado que a legalidade, isoladamente, não poderia mais sustentar a legitimidade das ações estatais, sendo necessário investigar qual o elemento estrutural concede validade aos atos estatais. Utilizando dométodo hipotético-dedutivo, partiu-se das seguintes hipóteses: a lei isoladamente não compreende o elemento estrutural da validade dos atos; e, a participação dos destinatários danorma em sua formação constitui o elemento estruturante das (...) decisões estatais. As hipóteses levantadas foram confirmadas. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a crítica de Waldron a Rawls, feita no livro “Law and Disagreement”. Queremos saber se nessa crítica está implícita a ideia de que Rawls faz uma má idealização. Para fazer isso, teremos, em primeiro lugar, que esclarecer o que é uma “teoria ideal” e o que são boas ou más idealizações. Falaremos sobre essas distinções na primeira seção do artigo. Waldron ataca a alegada incapacidade da teoria de Rawls de tratar seriamente os desacordos sobre (...) princípios políticos. A exposição dessa crítica e a análise de seu desenrolar vai ocupar as parcelas mais significativas do artigo, e será feita nas seções seguintes. Ao fim da análise, defenderemos que, apesar de a crítica de Waldron ser forte, ela não implica que há más idealizações de Rawls. (shrink)

The term “speciesism” has played a key role in debates about the moral consideration of nonhuman animals, yet little work has been dedicated to clarifying its meaning. Consequently, the concept remains poorly understood and is often employed in ways that might display a speciesist bias themselves. To address this problem, this article develops a definition of speciesism in terms of discrimination and argues in favor of its advantages over alternative accounts. After discussing the key desiderata for a definition of discrimination (...) in general and speciesism in particular, a wide and evaluative account of speciesism is presented. According to it, speciesism is unjustified consideration or treatment of those who are not classified as belonging to a certain species. The article then discusses rival accounts, namely narrow and descriptive definitions of speciesism. The article argues that such accounts are problematic as they overly restrict the scope of phenomena that can be identified as speciesist and disrupt the continuity with other forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism. (shrink)

The moral consideration of nonhuman animals and the critique of speciesism have been defended by appeal to a variety of ethical theories. One of the main approaches in moral and political philosophy today from which to launch such a defense is egalitarianism, which is the view that we should aim at favoring the worse off by reducing inequality. This paper explains what egalitarianism is and shows the important practical consequences it has for nonhuman animals, both those that are exploited by (...) humans and those in need of aid in the wild. Egalitarianism implies rejecting speciesism, and in practice it prescribes ceasing to exploit nonhuman animals as well as assisting them. Moreover, because they are worse off in comparison to humans, egalitarianism prescribes giving priority to the interests nonhuman animals. Due to this, egalitarianism gives us extra reasons to defend them beyond those entailed by other nonspeciesist approaches. (shrink)

The argument from relevance expresses an intuition that, although shared by many applied ethicists, has not been analyzed and systematized in the form of a clear argument thus far. This paper does this by introducing the concept of value relevance, which has been used before in economy but not in the philosophical literature. The paper explains how value relevance is different from moral relevance, and distinguishes between direct and indirect ways in which the latter can depend on the former. These (...) clarifications allow the argument to explain in detail how we can make two claims. The first one is that being a recipient of value should be the only criterion for full moral considerability. This follows if we accept that value relevance should determine, directly or indirectly, moral relevance. The second claim is that, given what the main theories of wellbeing imply regarding what entities can be recipients of value, sentience is both a sufficient and a necessary criterion for full moral considerability. The paper argues that this conclusion stands even if we hold views that consider other values different from sentience. (shrink)

This paper presents some of the most promising ways wild animals are currently being helped, as well as other ways of helping that may be implemented easily in the near future. They include measures to save animals affected by harmful weather events, wild animal vaccination programs, and projects aimed at reducing suffering among synanthropic animals. The paper then presents other ways of helping wild animals that, while noncontroversial, may reduce aggregate suffering at the ecosystem level. The paper argues that impracticability (...) and normative objections against reducing wild animal suffering fail against these ways of helping wild animals. (shrink)

The use of the concept of moral status is commonplace today in debates about the moral consideration of entities lacking certain special capacities, such as nonhuman animals. This concept has been typically used to defend the view that adult human beings have a status higher than all those entities. However, even those who disagree with this claim have often accepted the idea of moral status as if it were part of an undisputed received way of thinking in ethics. This paper (...) argues that the use of this concept, however common, distorts our understanding of how to behave towards different individuals in different circumstances. When moral status is identified with the interest in living or the capacity for well-being, it becomes an arbitrary and irrelevant criterion. When it is used as a synonym of moral consideration or considerability, in a way that is compatible with the principle of equal consideration, it becomes trivial and confusing. When used, instead, to defend the unequal moral consideration of interests of equal weight, it has several implausible implications. In particular, the claim that unequal status is justified because of the value of cognitive capacities implausibly entails that our exercising those capacities should have priority over the promotion of our wellbeing. The idea of full moral status is also problematic as it implies the possibility of status monsters. In addition, its use is based in a misconceived way of what it would really entail to have a full status by virtue of having rational capacities. The paper concludes that we have strong reasons to abandon the concept of moral status altogether. (shrink)

La relación entre el problema de la temporalidad del valor y el de nuestra persistencia diacrónica prácticamente no ha sido explorada hasta ahora. Sin embargo, el análisis de cada una de estas cuestiones puede arrojar luz sobre la otra de manera interesante. Este artículo argumentará que las conexiones entre la asimetría de nuestras actitudes hacia el futuro y el pasado, y la cuestión de nuestra persistencia diacrónica pueden defenderse sin incurrir en modo alguno a una petición de principio. The relation (...) between the problem of the temporality of value and the problem of our diachronic persistence has virtually not been explored so far. However, the analysis of these questions can shed light on each other in an interesting way. This paper argues that an explanation of the connections between the asymmetry of our attitudes towards the future and the past and the question of our diachronic persistence is possible without begging the question in any way. (shrink)

There are many circumstances in which vegans are treated or considered worse than nonvegans, both in the private and the public sphere, either due to the presence of a bias against them or for structural reasons. For instance, vegans sometimes suffer harassment, have issues at their workplace, or find little vegan food available. In many cases they are forced to contribute to, or to participate in, animal exploitation against their will when states render it illegitimate to oppose or refuse to (...) support some uses of animals. For the most part this remains socially invisible. Vegans, however, often recognize this as a form of discrimination against them. But they seldom campaign against it, as they regard it as a consequence of another and more important discrimination, i.e. speciesist discrimination against nonhuman animals. If this is correct, discrimination against vegans can be characterized as a form of second-order discrimination, that is, discrimination against those who oppose another form of discrimination. If speciesism really is unjustified and discriminatory, then discrimination against vegans will always be discriminatory and unjustified too. But even if our current attitudes towards animals were justified there would be strong reasons to claim that vegans do suffer several forms of private and public discrimination that are unjustified. (shrink)

This article examines and rejects the view that nonhuman animals cannot be recipients of justice, and argues that the main reasons in favor of universal human rights and global justice also apply in the case of the international protection of the interests of nonhuman animals. In any plausible theory of wellbeing, sentience matters; mere species membership or the place where an animal is born does not. This does not merely entail that regulations of the use of animals aimed at reducing (...) their suffering should be implemented. It actually supports the end of such use, as well as other positive steps to provide help and to promote what is good not only for domesticated animals, but also for those living in the wild. Another reason to bring the protection of animals' interests into the international arena is that it is at this level that numerous animal exploitation industries enjoy the protection of different agreements and institutions. It does not follow from this that changing international law should be animal advocates' first priority, but it does follow that they should conduct their work internationally and not limit it to their own countries. (shrink)

According to the Internal Aspects View, the value of different outcomesdepends solely on the internal features possessed by each outcome and theinternal relations between them. This paper defends the Internal AspectsView against Larry Temkin’s defence of the Essentially Comparative View,according to which the value of different outcomes depends on what isthe alternative outcome they are compared with. The paper discusses bothperson-affecting arguments and Spectrum Arguments. The paper doesnot defend a person-affecting view over an impersonal one, but it arguesthat although there (...) are intuitive person-affecting principles that entail anEssentially Comparative View, the intuitions that support these principlescan also be acommodated by other principles that are compatible with theInternal Aspects View. The paper also argues that the rejection of transitivityand the Internal Aspects View does not help us to solve the challengespresented by Spectrum Arguments. Despite this, the arguments presentedby Temkin do succeed in showing that, unfortunately, our intuitions arechaotic and inconsistent. The paper argues that this has metaethicalconsequences that will be unwelcome by a moral realist such as Temkin,since they challenge the idea that our intuitions may track a moral realityexisting independently of our preferences. (shrink)

v. 1. Dalle origini a Kant.--v. 2. Il pensiero contemporaneo.

Seguindo de perto a caracterização que Robert Blanché faz da lógica dos modernos em seu livro História da Lógica de Aristóteles a Bertrand Russell, pretendo mostrar como as Regulae de Descartes instanciam paradigmaticamente algumas das principais características das lógicas reformadas, típicas desse momento histórico. O próprio Blanché oferece vários exemplos do pertencimento de Descartes a esse contexto. De minha parte, pretendo contribuir com a discussão realizando um exame mais detalhado da parte final da Regra X, na qual desponta, já nesta (...) que é uma das primeiras obras de Descartes, certa noção de atividade mental, que está em relação tanto com as críticas cartesianas às matemáticas, no Discurso do Método, quanto com o argumento do cogito, nas Meditações. (shrink)

This paper presents how the classical architectural forms – Greek-roman forms – are preserved in early Christian churches built in the Palestinian area between the fourth and the sixth centuries AD. We follow the concept that architecture defines a non-verbal communication form, a language possible to be decoded. Will be discussed questions regarding long-term preservation or change of this buildings in a historical structure evaluating their formal and ideological aspects.

Of Grammatology's ‘Exergue’ contemplates the closure of an historico-metaphysical epoch, that of logocentrism. The notion of ‘epochality’ cannot be reduced to the idea of a ‘period of time’ or a ‘system of chronology’. Reading Martin Heidegger's ‘epochs of Being’ and Carl Schmitt's ‘nomos of the Earth’, I argue that logocentrism has a fundamental colonial character. Derrida is concerned with a space ordering, a land-appropriation process on the verge of becoming global. Logocentrism is always a logonomocentrism.

This article is a belated contribution to a Common Knowledge symposium on the “unanticipated conceptual practice” of “anthropological philosophy.” The basic argument is that the groundwork for this emerging approach, associated foremost with Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's book Métaphysiques cannibales of 2009, was laid in the 1970s by the controversial French anthropologists Pierre and Hélène Clastres. It is argued that the Clastres took the intellectual practices of Guarani shamans and prophets as analogous to the those of ancient Greek philosophers but (...) also as sharply critical of the principles that underlay early Western metaphysics. (shrink)

In this study the influence of irrational beliefs and perfectionism on the emergence of competitive anxiety was investigated. While previous studies indicate that higher irrational beliefs predict greater competitive anxiety, in the present study it is hypothesized that this relationship is mediated by perfectionism. A serial atemporal multiple mediation analysis revealed that both adaptive and maladaptive perfectionism were significant partial mediators between irrational beliefs and competitive anxiety. The total score and all four subscale scores on irrational beliefs had both direct (...) and indirect effects on cognitive competitive anxiety, the latter effects mediated by both forms of perfectionism. Depreciation beliefs had a direct effect, and demandingness and awfulizing had indirect effects, on somatic competitive anxiety when both forms of perfectionism were entered as mediators. These findings suggest that both irrational beliefs and perfectionism influence the emergence of competitive anxiety, therefore rational emotive behavioral therapy with a focus upon perfectionism may be an effective means of reducing competitive anxiety in athletes. (shrink)

Ecumenical logic aims to peacefully join classical and intuitionistic logic systems, allowing for reasoning about both classical and intuitionistic statements. This paper presents a semantic tableau for propositional ecumenical logic and proves its soundness and completeness concerning Ecumenical Kripke models. We introduce the Ecumenical Propositional Tableau ( $$E_T$$ ) and demonstrate its effectiveness in handling mixed statements.

In standard cases of discrimination the interests of the discriminatees are considered comparatively worse than those of others. Accordingly, discrimination is often defined as some form of differential consideration or treatment which, among other features, entails a disadvantage for discriminatees. There are some apparent forms of nonstandard discrimination, however, in which it seems that this need not occur. This paper examines three of them: epistemic discrimination, discrimination against entities unable to be harmed by it and nonhierarchical segregation. If, as it (...) seems, these really are forms of discrimination that means standard definitions may fail or must be reinterpreted. There is a way to account for the mentioned nonstandard forms of discrimination by claiming that all forms of worse consideration or treatment can be considered discriminatory. This, however, entails interpreting the term “worse” in a very broad manner, and some may not find this solution intuitive. Despite this, the paper will argue that alternative accounts entail more serious problems. (shrink)

OSCAR HORTA | : This paper examines the extent of the opposition between environmentalists and those concerned with wild-animal suffering and considers whether there are any points they may agree on. The paper starts by presenting the reasons to conclude that suffering and premature death prevail over positive well-being in nature. It then explains several ways to intervene in order to aid animals and prevent the harms they suffer, and claims that we should support them. In particular, the paper (...) argues in favour of carrying out more research to learn the best ways to intervene without causing more harm to other animals and to intervene first in areas significantly transformed by human action. It then examines what positions environmentalist views can have towards intervention in nature for the sake of animals. It claims that, while ecocentric and naturocentric views will strongly oppose intervention in certain circumstances, they should not do so in other cases in which the values they promote are not at stake or might be outweighed. The paper then argues that, contrary to what it might seem at first, biocentric views should strongly support intervention. It then discusses whether there may be certain practical issues about which those concerned with wild animal suffering and environmentalists may support the same approach, such as opposition to the greening of desert ecosystems. Finally, it claims that raising awareness about wild animal suffering seems to be the most urgent task now for those concerned about it. | : Le présent article examine l’étendue de l’opposition entre les environnementalistes et ceux qui se préoccupent de la souffrance des animaux sauvages, afin de déterminer s’il existe des points sur lesquels ils peuvent être en accord. L’article débute en présentant les raisons permettant de conclure que la souffrance et la mort prématurée l’emportent sur le bien-être positif dans la nature. Ensuite, il explique plusieurs façons d’intervenir afin d’aider les animaux et de prévenir les maux dont ils souffrent et plaide pour la mise en oeuvre de celles-ci. Plus précisément, l’article préconise un plus grand nombre de recherches afin de déterminer les meilleures façons d’intervenir sans causer davantage de maux à d’autres animaux ainsi que pour prioriser des interventions en des endroits que l’action humaine a significativement transformés. L’article examine par la suite les positions que les conceptions environnementalistes peuvent adopter quant aux interventions dans la nature pour le bien des animaux. L’article propose que, bien que des visions écocentriques et naturocentriques s’opposent vivement à l’intervention dans certaines circonstances, elles ne devraient cependant pas s’y opposer dans les cas où les valeurs qu’elles promeuvent n’entrent pas en jeu ou peuvent avoir moins de poids que d’autres facteurs. L’article soutient ensuite que, contrairement à ce que l’on pourrait penser à première vue, les théories biocentristes devraient fortement appuyer l’intervention. Il pose la question à savoir si certains problèmes pratiques peuvent faire l’objet d’une approche commune parmi les environnementalistes et ceux qui se soucient de la souffrance des animaux sauvages, par exemple s’opposer à l’écologisation des déserts. Enfin, l’article propose que la tâche la plus pressante pour ceux qui se préoccupent de la souffrance des animaux sauvages consiste à accroître la sensibilisation à ce problème. (shrink)

Many people think we should refrain from intervening in nature as much as possible. One of the main reasons for thinking this way is that the existence of nature is a net positive. However, population dynamics teaches us that most sentient animals who come into existence in nature die shortly thereafter, mostly in painful ways. Those who survive often suffer greatly due to natural causes. If sentient beings matter, this gives us reasons to intervene to prevent such harms. This counterintuitive (...) conclusion can be opposed by arguing that we should not care about nonhuman animals; that other values, such as the existence of certain ecosystemic relations or of untouched wild areas, count for more than the interests of sentient beings; or that intervention in nature cannot succeed. There are, however, strong reasons to reject these claims and to support significant intervention in nature for the sake of animals, despite our deep-rooted intuitions to the contrary. (shrink)

The main objective of this article is to analyze the conceptual connection between the Doctrine of Children’s Education, briefly mentioned in Spinoza’s Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, and the concept of emendation present at the very center of this Treatise’s title. A close textual exegesis of the opening paragraphs of TIE reveals why such a doctrine cannot be the ascetic renunciation of the content of ordinary life. We shall see instead that a new institution of life shall be possible only through (...) a deep plunge into the understanding of ordinary confused life. A Spinozan Doctrine of Children’s Education shall then be conceived as a pedagogy guided by an error mapping principle, i.e., a pedagogy capable of amending the mistaken beliefs of students through their understanding of the way these are produced as real events in the world. This would be an immanent pedagogy, which could be relevant to any form of contemporary thought that seeks a truly liberating education. (shrink)

This chapter aims to establish a philosophical discussion about the epistemological conditions of “observation”, from the cybersemiotic transdisciplinary view of knowing. For this purpose, the discussion will be divided into three parts, each one of them with the intention of outlining a conceptual critique that later allows a pertinent justification of the observation from a transcendental semiotics. This work is based on a problem: it seeks to show that a the cybersemiotic point of view, to consider on a foundationalist stance, (...) fails to overcome the epistemological contradictions involved in the contemporary critique of modern philosophy. Hence, the objective on this work is to propose as an alternative the teleological and nominalist attitude of transcendental semiotics, and also as an epistemological principle that allows overcoming problems of the foundationalist. Then, in a first moment, we will seek to establish a critique of the phenomenology of observation from the pragmatic point of view, developed by N. R. Hanson and Richard Rorty. In this direction, the contradictions involved in the definition of knowledge will be shown from the phenomenological (perception without representation) and phenomenological (states of inner consciousness) positions. In general terms, the epistemological problems found in the foundations of knowledge based on observation will be exposed: specifically, the problem of the empirical basis and perception and the question of the mind as an inner space. Then, in a second moment, a characterization of the "observation" and the "observable fact" will be made from the cybersemiotic point of view. In this sense, these concepts will be described from the peircean semiosis, starting from the theoretical link proposed by Soren Brier. Hence, when considering the observation within the sphere of significance, the approaches will show a non-phenomenological characterization of knowledge and, from there, the overcoming of pragmatic critiques towards phenomenology. The closing will allow circumscribing knowledge from a communicative, semiotic and autopoietic approach. Finally, and as a contribution to the state of the discussion, the present chapter will make a defense of the cybersemiotic phenomenology of observation but considering the pragmatic conditions of knowledge from a transcendental semiotics perspective. In this sense, the transcendental concepts of truth-consensus and fin-ideal will be used to develop a relevant theoretical field that allows a transcendental justification of the communicative-intersubjective nature of knowledge postulated by cybersemiotics. (shrink)

L’œuvre de Gaston Bachelard n’est pas toujours prise en considération dans le cadre de l’histoire de l’esthétique française. S’il est vrai que le philosophe n’a pas élaboré une théorie esthétique accomplie, ses travaux sur l’imagination et la rêverie non seulement démontrent une connaissance des débats théoriques de l’époque, mais, plus profondément, représentent une prise de position en faveur d’une « esthétique concrète » qui s’écarte des stériles disputes philosophiques d’académie pour s’appuyer directement sur la présence matérielle de l’œuvre d’art, aussi (...) poétique que visuelle, afin de réintégrer le sentir dans le penser. Il s’agit donc d’interroger cette manière de réintégrer l’ aisthesis dans le logos à travers le travail de l’imagination, en retrouvant ainsi « une unité du monde ». C’est précisément dans la rencontre avec la beauté que le sujet s’ouvre au monde de façon pré-catégoriale et, en même temps, que le monde fait l’objet d’une expérience non-objective. Cela ouvre la voie à une esthéticité transcendantale jamais théorisée explicitement, mais concrètement mise au travail dans les œuvres du philosophe. (shrink)

El particularismo moral rechaza la pertinencia del recurso a los principios en ética. Una serie de autores de filiación postanalítica neowittgensteiniana han asumido esta posición conducidos por planteamientos antiteóricos, que rechazan el rol evaluativo de la filosofía moral. En este artículo se presenta y examina críticamente esta posición. No se afirma aquí que los antiteóricos incurran necesariamente en posiciones inconsistentes, pero se apunta que su crítica a la teoría moral puede estar descaminada, al descansar en una comprensión incorrecta del carácter (...) de la justificación en ética. -/- Moral particularism claims that principles have no use in ethics. A number of authors working in the postanalitic neowittgensteinian tradition have held this position, driven by an antitheoretical viewpoint which rejects the evaluative role of moral philosophy. This paper presents and examines this position from a critical perspective. It does not claim that antitheorists necessarily hold inconsistent positions, but it points out that their critique of moral theory may be misinformed, since it rests on a wrong conception of what justification in ethics is about. (shrink)

Conforme al antropocentrismo moral, está justificado tratar de forma desfavorable a los animales no humanos frente a los seres humanos. Esta idea se mantiene a menudo indicando que hay ciertas capacidades o relaciones, defendidas como moralmente relevantes, que solo tendrían estos últimos. El argumento de la superposición de especies apunta, sin embargo, que esta asunción se encuentra equivocada. Toda una serie de seres humanos incumplen también tal criterio. De este modo, si continuamos defendiendo su relevancia, estaremos aceptando que se dé (...) a estos seres humanos un trato coincidente con el que se proporciona hoy en día a los animales no humanos. Si, en cambio, se quiere dar una plena consideración y un consiguiente trato ecuánime a todos los seres humanos, ello implicará el rechazo de tal criterio, y la extensión de tal consideración y trato a los demás animales sintientes. Se ha intentado responder a este argumento asumiendo que sus premisas son equivocadas, o sosteniendo que hay otras razones por las cuales todos los seres humanos deben ser moralmente considerables. En este artículo se examinan estas respuestas y se concluye que ninguna de ellas tiene éxito. (shrink)

Se sostiene de manera habitual que los animales no pueden ser considerados personas, razón por la cual no es posible efectuar una demanda en su nombre. Este artículo examina tal idea. En él se analizan en primer lugar los distintos sentidos que el término "persona" tiene en el ámbito coloquial, metafísico, moral y jurídico, y se muestra que no hay una conexión necesaria entre estos. Asimismo, se desgranan y evalúan los distintos argumentos a favor del antropocentrismo moral, concluyéndose que ninguno (...) de ellos tiene éxito. Finalmente, se argumenta que si se continúa manteniendo la centralidad en el plano jurídico de la categoría de la personalidad, pero se excluye del alcance de esta a los animales de especies distintas a la nuestra, se incurrirá en una posición que carecerá de justificación moral. (shrink)

Esse artigo pretende explorar os temas do estatuto e da função do intelectual em dois autores significativos para a questão a partir do século XX: Julien Benda e Jean-Paul Sartre. Trata-se de revisitar as noções de autonomia e engajamento, fundamentais para uma compreensão comparativa entre os dois autores. O texto procura caracterizar de forma ampla o tipo de intelectual defendido por Benda no mesmo passo em que procura evidenciar a gênese e as condições de aparecimento do intelectual para Sartre. O (...) Caso Dreyfus, momento histórico de surgimento do intelectual como o conhecemos, é revisitado a fim de estabelecermos um referencial concreto para as posições dos autores em discussão. A partir dos elementos levantados, procura-se argumentar no sentido das divergências entre Benda e Sartre sobre a natureza e o papel do intelectual, mas também propõe-se evidenciar o solo comum em que os dois autores parecem trafegar. O texto, ainda, aponta questões para se pensar o intelectual a partir das novas condições políticas e sociais na contemporaneidade. (shrink)

In this article, I present a five-part critique of the main aspects of the second edition of Music Matters by David Elliott and Marissa Silverman. This edition further develops their praxial philosophy, comprising topics on the nature and value of music education from a normative perspective, which in turn is developed to suit all musical education contexts. My analysis is organized in five main arguments concerning, first, an absence of historicity; second, the adoption of universalist premises; third, the inconsistency between (...) the concepts of personhood and musical value; fourth, the adoption of a normative philosophy; and fifth, the relation between synthesis and content in the chapters. I argue that the book is constructed from a universalistic perspective and that its premises have epistemological inconsistencies. I offer a critical analysis of this extensive work for the purpose of engaging in a dialogue about themes which are relevant to the further development of philosophical thought in music education. (shrink)

O artigo trata dos aspectos gerais da articulação entre filosofia e literatura conforme presentes na obra de Franklin Leopoldo e Silva. Valendo-se de certa tensão entre a atividade do filósofo e aquela do professor de filosofia, o texto percorre elementos nos trabalhos de Franklin dedicados a Proust, Bergson e Sartre, os quais permitem delimitar a relação de distância e proximidade entre os gêneros literário e filosófico. Propõe-se, à revelia do filósofo/professor, que seu trabalho evidencia certo estágio do desenvolvimento da filosofia (...) no Brasil, marcado pelo diálogo sistemático com a tradição filosófica, aliando rigor intelectual e síntese criativa, permitindo o que chamamos de coautoria. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta um quadro conceitual para examinar a questão do especismo. Começa definindo-o como a consideração ou tratamento desfavorável injustificado daqueles que não pertencem a uma determinada espécie. A seguir, esclarece alguns dos mal-entendidos comuns acerca do que é e do que não é o especismo. Depois disso, argumenta contra a confusão entre (1) os diferentes modos em que se pode defender o especismo; e (2) as diferentes posições que assumem o especismo como uma de suas premissas. Dependendo se (...) essas últimas aceitam ou não outros critérios para a consideração moral à parte do especismo, podem ser posições especistas simples ou combinadas. Mas o especismo segue sendo em todos os casos a mesma ideia. Finalmente, este artigo examina o conceito de antropocentrismo, que define como o tratamento ou consideração desfavorável daqueles que não são membros da espécie humana. O conceito de antropocentrismo difere do de especismo e do de misoteria (animadversão para com os animais não humanos). Não obstante, pode-se concluir que o antropocentrismo é uma forma de especismo, à luz do que indicam, entre outros, o argumento da sobreposição de espécies e o argumento da relevância. (shrink)

According to Schroeder-Heister 2018, proof-theoretic semantics is ‘an alternative to truth-condition semantics. It is based on the fundamental assumption that the central notion in terms of which meanings are assigned to certain expressions of our language, in particular to logical constants, is that of proof rather than truth. In this sense proof-theoretic semantics is semantics in terms of proof. Proof-theoretic semantics also means the semantics of proofs, i.e. the semantics of entities which describe how we arrive at certain assertions given (...) certain assumptions.' This text advocates that proof-theoretic semantics, as described above, was an approach to semantical issues in logic that appeared in mainstream philosophical literature at least a couple of centuries before the tradition of general proof theory (cf. Prawitz 1971) came into being. This is done by means of an interpretive analysis of Kant’s 1762 essay Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren, in which two theses are argued: first, that the issue of justifying the logical validity of inferences is approached by Kant in this text, in a strong sense, in terms of proofs; and second, that the purpose of his effort is to establish a point concerning the semantical equivalence between certain distinct valid inferences. (shrink)

In Zoopolis, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that intervention in nature to aid animals is sometimes permissible, and in some cases obligatory, to save them from the harms they commonly face. But they claim these interventions must have some limits, since they could otherwise disrupt the structure of the communities wild animals form, which should be respected as sovereign ones. These claims are based on the widespread assumption that ecosystemic processes ensure that animals have good lives in nature. However, this assumption (...) is, unfortunately, totally unrealistic. Most animals are r-strategists who die in pain shortly after coming into existence, and those who make it to maturity commonly suffer terrible harms too. In addition, most animals do not form the political communities Zoopolis describes. The situation of animals in the wild can therefore be considered analogous to one of humanitarian catastrophe, or to that of irretrievably failed states. It matches closely what a Hobbesian state of nature would be like. This means that intervention in nature to aid nonhuman animals should not be limited as Donaldson and Kymlicka argue. (shrink)

El presente trabajo se circunscribe al problema de la representación y la referencialidad de la imagen, mismo que, desde la filosofía de la ciencia ha cobrado nuevos matices en el contexto de la relación entre ciencia y arte. Así pues, en esta revisión se buscará establecer tres líneas de desarrollo: en primera instancia, se planteará el problema de la representación del objeto como un campo de interés común en los ámbitos de conocimiento, tanto en la ciencia como en el arte. (...) Luego, en un segundo momento, se abordará el problema filosófico implicado en la referencialidad de la imagen, a partir de las propuestas de Max Black y Rudolph Arnheim. Finalmente, para dar respuesta a la pregunta ¿bajo qué condiciones la imagen como representación establece un objeto de referencia?, se argumentará la función epistemológica de la imagen desde el punto de vista pragmático de la semiótica trascendental. En este sentido, en este trabajo se busca establecer un punto crítico a las posturas filosóficas, tanto de Black como de Arnheim, considerando que la pregunta acerca del objeto de referencia y la imagen están en relación con las condiciones de verdad que fundamentan un sistema de lenguaje. Por ello, a partir de la semiótica pragmática y la semiótica trascendental se postularán criterios diferentes al problema de la referencialidad de la imagen, y en esta dirección, se plantearán las condiciones pragmáticas de verdad que permiten justificar el conocimiento en la imagen derivado de las prácticas epistemológicas tanto en la ciencia como en el arte. (shrink)